Citation Information for “Thomas Aquinas, ‘The Argument from Design’”

This page is not intended to be original or authoritative. The page is a summary of some main points and associated notes on the topic. Undoubtedly, there are scholarly and authoritative sources, both primary and secondary which ought be cited rather than these notes.

However if you find the page of use, your citation should meet the style requirements of the publication for which you are submitting your paper. In general, the current page may be cited in this manner:

Archie, Lee C, "Thomas Aquinas, ‘The Argument from Design,’" Philosophy of Religion (June 26, 2006) URL=<http://philosophy.lander.edu/intro/governance.shtml>.

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“… Hume does not hold that the argument from design is simply fallacious or invalid. On the contrary, he acknowledges its force. When he contemplates the order of the world, he too is led to treat it as the manifestation of what transcends the world.” H. O. Mounce, Hume's Naturalism (London: Taylor & Francis, 1999), 117.

	Citation Information for “Thomas Aquinas, ‘The Argument from Design’” Philosophy of Religion
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Nature of Philosophy Divisions of Philosophy Characteristics of a Philosophical Problem Principle of Charity Philosophy of Life Socratic Philosophy I Socratic Philosophy II Russell's Value of Philosophy Tolstoy's Faith Camus's Nobility of Soul James on the Significant Life Philosophy of Religion Introduction to Phil. of Religion Anselm's Ontological Argument Kant's Existence is Not a Predicate Thomas Aquinas's Five Ways --Motion --Cause --Necessary Being --Gradation --Design Paley's Teleological Argument Hume's Design Argument: A Critique Pascal's Wager Kierkegaard's Can God's Existence Be Proved? Dostoevsky's The Problem of Evil Hick's Evil Can Be Allowed Kierkegaard's Truth as Subjectivity Philosophical Ethics Free Will and Determinism Spinoza's Human Beings are Determined James's The Will to Believe Plato's Myth of Gyges Egoism is Mistaken Westermark's Ethics are Relative Moore's Objectivity of Moral Judgments Aristotle's Life of Excellence Bentham's The Greatest Good Nietzsche's Slave and Master Morality Sartre's Existential Ethics Philosophy of Art Voltaire's Beauty is Relative Hume's Art Has Standards Pater's Art as Emotional Response Bell's Art as Significant Form Philosophy of Knowledge Comte's Positive Philosophy Feuerbach's Scientific Determinism Russell's Correspondence Theory Bradley's Coherence Theory James's Pragmatic Theory Aristotle's Future Truths
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